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R v Collins and Ashworth Hospital Authority ex parte Brady 
Maurice Kay J Liverpool District Registry
(Judgment given 10th March 2000 - at time of going to print the decision is unreported.)
Appearances: Mr Nigel Pleming QC and Ms Eleanor Grey (Reid Minty) for the Respondent; Mr
Benet Hytner QC, Ms Philippa Kaufmann and Mr Robin Makin, solicitor advocate (E Rex Makin
and Co) for the Applicant.
Introduction
The case concerns the right of a psychiatric patient to choose to die by refusing intervention from
the hospital. The Court considered the treatment provisions of Part IV of the Mental Health Act,
capacity at common law and the legitimate interests of society in preserving life. However the
notoriety of Mr Brady, and his own personality, meant that underlying the judgment were
considerations of public policy as much as legal analysis.
The facts
The Applicant, Ian Brady, was 62 years old at the date of the hearing. In 1966 he was sentenced to
three concurrent terms of life imprisonment, for which the Secretary of State fixed a whole life
tariff. Mr Brady accepts that he will never be released. In November 1985 he was transferred to the
then Park Lane Hospital (now incorporated into Ashworth) under section 47 Mental Health Act
1983. In 1995 he was moved to Jade Ward, and restrictions were put on his freedom. By way of
compensation he was granted the use of a personal computer and special visiting arrangements.
However, following the publication of the Fallon Report1 the computer was withdrawn and
security for visitors was increased. In addition the Applicant began to fear a return to the prison
system. On 18th June 1999 an automatic tribunal review confirmed that the Applicant was
correctly detained in hospital. 
In September 1999 the Acting Medical Director arranged a meeting to review security on Jade
Ward. It was agreed that the Applicant should be moved as soon as possible to a more secure
environment. On 30th September, while the Applicant was writing in his room, a six-person team
entered in full riot gear without explanation, strip searched him and took him to a waiting van
which transferred him to Lawrence Ward. The Applicant was under restraint for about fifty
minutes, during which time he offered little or no resistance. His arm was injured, possibly
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1 The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the
Personality Disorder Unit, Ashworth Special Hospital.
Cm 4194 (1999) The Stationary Office. 
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fractured, during the process. No-one told him why he had been moved; he feared he was being
transferred to prison. The Applicant has never assaulted or offered physical resistance to staff,
either in hospital or before that in prison.
The Applicant’s response was to refuse food or sweetened drinks. He was on hunger strike
continuously until the date of judgment. It is clear from his records that his initial purpose was to
protest, not to starve himself to death; he had used hunger strikes as a tactic some years previously. 
At the end of October his new Responsible Medical Officer, Dr Collins, expressed the view that
the clinical team should intervene to prevent deterioration in the Applicant’s condition. On 29th
October force-feeding commenced, by way of a naso-gastric tube. The Applicant did not consent
to this but offered no resistance either. Dr Rix, a consultant forensic psychiatrist, offered a second
opinion, but the Applicant refused to see him.
Professor Sines, who was appointed by Ashworth to consider the Applicant’s complaints, reported
on 30th November 1999. He was strongly critical of the move but decided that it had been correct
to commence force feeding.
On 19th October and 3rd December 1999 and 17th February 2000 the Applicant was interviewed
by Professor Maden, who had seen him several times before at the request of his solicitors.
Following the 3rd December interview Professor Maden reported that the Applicant had thoughts
of suicide, based on a rational argument that the regime to which he was subjected made his life
intolerable. He could not say under what circumstances he would be prepared to end his protest. 
The Applicant’s application for judicial review sought to challenge “the continuing decision... to
force feed the Applicant,... apparently made pursuant to section 63 of the Mental Health Act
1983.” Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on 2nd February 2000 by Forbes J, who
also directed that the psychiatrists should attend for cross-examination. The present judgment was
given in open court.
The law
Section 63 Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA): “The consent of a patient shall not be required for
any medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering, not being
treatment under section 57 or 58 above, if the treatment is given by or under the direction of the
responsible medical officer.”
Section 145 MHA: ‘medical treatment’ includes “nursing, and also includes care, habilitation and
rehabilitation under medical supervision.” 
Medical treatment has been given a particularly wide interpretation in cases of psychopathic
(personality) disorder: Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland2. In B v Croydon Health Authority3
Hoffman LJ stated: “Nursing and care concurrent with the core treatment or as a necessary
prerequisite to such treatment or to prevent the patient from causing harm to himself or to
alleviate the consequences of the disorder are, in my view, all capable of being ancillary to a
treatment calculated to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of the psychopathic disorder. It would
seem strange if a hospital could, without the patient’s consent, give him treatment directed to
alleviating a psychopathic disorder showing itself in suicidal tendencies, but not without such
consent be able to treat the consequences of a suicide attempt.”
2 (1999) 2 WLR 28 at 44 3 (1995) 1 All ER 683 at 687
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Precedent facts and ‘super-Wednesbury’
Mr Hytner QC, for the Applicant, submitted that the court had first to decide whether force feeding
was in fact treatment ‘for the mental disorder from which he is suffering’. The fact that Dr Collins,
the RMO, had reasonably believed it to be so was not the point, as this was a ‘precedent fact’
without which the treatment could not be covered by section 63: see Khawaja v Secretary of State for
the Home Department4. The words ‘in the opinion of’ the RMO did not appear in the section and
should not be implied into it. Any derogation from fundamental human rights should be construed
strictly in favour of the Applicant: Khawaja (above) and R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department ex parte Simms and O’Brien5. Moreover, the so-called ‘super-Wednesbury test’ in human
rights cases applied as set out in R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith6 (per Sir Thomas Bingham
MR): ‘The more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court will require by
way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable in the sense outlined above.’
Mr Pleming QC, for the Respondent Authority, submitted that section 63 should be read in the
context of Part IV of the Act as a whole. No question of precedent fact arose; the court’s role was
limited to supervising the RMO on Wednesbury principles. In the same way section 62 spoke of
treatment which ‘is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life’. If the court approached
section 62 on a precedent fact basis it would seriously undermine the ability of healthcare
professionals to take immediate, emergency steps to save life. Likewise, in R v Mental Health Act
Commission, ex parte X7 the court had held that a challenge under section 57 should be considered
according to Wednesbury principles. In the present case, therefore, the court should not interfere
with Dr Collins’ judgement unless it was irrational.
The judgment
(i) Section 63
Maurice Kay J said that the psychiatrists agreed that the Applicant had a psychopathic or
personality disorder. However, Professor Maden approached the matter on the basis that a person
without the disorder could have made the same decision on rational grounds, while Dr Collins
concluded that the decision to refuse food was caused by the personality disorder. The Applicant’s
response to the move had been wholly disproportionate and it was “ridiculous not to look to the
personality disorder for the explanation”. Dr Rix had come to a similar conclusion. 
His Lordship had no doubt that the opinions of Dr Collins and Dr Rix were correct as to the part
the personality disorder played in the hunger strike. He was therefore satisfied that Dr Collins’
approach to section 63 satisfied both the ‘precedent fact’ test and the ‘super-Wednesbury’ test.
Section 63 was triggered because what arose was the need for medical treatment for the mental
disorder from which the Applicant was suffering. The fact that a person without mental disorder
could reach the same decision on a rational basis in similar circumstances did not avail the
Applicant because he reached and persisted in his decision because of his personality disorder. 
At the commencement of the hunger strike his Lordship was satisfied that the Applicant’s
intention was not to starve himself to death. While he could not reach a certain conclusion about
the Applicant’s present intention, the likelihood was that he was playing the system. 
4 (1984) 1 AC 74
5 (1999) 3 WLR 328 at 341
6 (1996) QB 517 at 514
7 (1988) 9 BMLR 77
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Mr Hytner had submitted that Dr Collins and his team had failed to take into account the quality
of the particular life that was being preserved. That argument did not get off the ground, because
the Applicant had not to this day told Dr Collins that his intention was to starve himself to death.
Moreover, the Applicant was physically healthy and a significant amount of his ‘impoverished’ life
resulted from his extremism in dealing with his circumstances and his uncompromising
relationship with Ashworth. There was therefore no element of irrationality in Dr Collins’
decision to force feed.
(ii) Capacity
The parties had also asked the judge to rule on the Defendants’ second argument, that the
Applicant lacked capacity to consent and that they had a duty at common law to act in his best
interests. It was common ground that a mentally disordered patient might nevertheless have
capacity, and that the test in Re C8 applied. Dr Collins had reported that the Applicant had the
intellectual ability to appreciate the risk of refusing food but that his ability to weigh the
information was impaired by the emotions and perceptions he had at the time, which were related
to his personality disorder. Dr Rix had agreed. Neither Dr Collins nor Dr Rix saw total incapacity,
but rather incapacity in the area relating to his battle with the Ashworth authorities. Professor
Maden, however, did not accept that the Applicant lacked capacity. Mr Hytner submitted that far
more disordered minds had been held to retain capacity, for example in Re C (above).
His Lordship was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that, although he was a man of well above
average intelligence, the Applicant had been incapacitated in relation to decisions about food
refusal since 25th October. His doctors had therefore been empowered to supply medical
treatment in his best interests. This was a matter of clinical judgement and subject to the test in
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee9. 
(iii) A duty to prevent suicide?
Mr Pleming submitted that even if he retained capacity the Applicant’s right of self-determination
was not absolute. There was a public interest in preserving life, preventing suicide and maintaining
the integrity of the medical profession. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb10, which
concerned a prisoner on hunger strike, Thorpe J had put forward the following principle: “...if an
adult of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his
life would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes
even though they do not consider it to be in his best interest to do so”. He had cited Re T11,
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland12 and the American case of Thor v Superior Court13. However, Mr
Pleming submitted that Robb simply established that there was no duty to intervene and did not
address the question of whether there was a power to do so. More recent cases had established that
police and prison officers owed a prisoner a common law duty to take care to prevent him from
committing suicide or causing himself harm (see for example Reeves v Commissioner of Police14). 
8 (1994) 1 WLR 290
9 (1957) 1 WLR 582
10 (1995) 1 All ER 677
11 (1992) 4 All ER 649
12 (1993) AC 789
13 (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 725
14 (1999) 3 WLR 363
184
Journal of Mental Health Law November 2000
The judge said that it would be somewhat odd if there was a duty to prevent suicide by an act, but
not even a power to intervene to prevent self-destruction by starvation. He did not consider that,
as a first instance judge, he had enough evidence to make a finding in this complex issue, but he
did not believe that he would be constrained by authority from finding for the Respondents.
(iv) Conclusion
His Lordship was entirely satisfied that the decision to commence and continue force feeding was
justified by reference to section 63 and that it was in all respects lawful, rational and fair. Even if
section 63 had not applied it would still have been lawful because the Applicant had at all material
times lacked capacity by reason of his disorder and the steps taken by the doctors were reasonably
perceived to be in his best interests. The application was therefore dismissed.
Costs
Ms Grey, for the Respondent, asked for an order that the Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs.
As he was legally aided this should be in the form that determination of his liability should be
postponed for such period as the Court saw fit. As Mr Brady used litigation as a tool, such an order
would keep an eye on the possibility of settling for liability to costs orders. 
Ms Kaufmann, for the Applicant, said that the Respondents had themselves welcomed the
opportunity to have a Court determine the issue. She conceded that the proceedings were
adversarial, but maintained that a public interest had been served by bringing the matter to Court.
Mr Brady would have to seek the permission of the Court to commence proceedings which might
result in a monetary award and obtain positive advice from his legal advisers before any such
proceedings would be funded by the Legal Aid Board. It would be an improper denial of access to
the Court to impose a costs order as a disincentive; the Court had mechanisms for dealing with
frivolous applications.
Maurice Kay J said he would make the order for costs in the form sought by Ms Grey because it
was the normal consequence of adversarial proceedings, and not for collateral purposes. 
He granted Legal Aid taxation and refused leave to appeal.
Comment:
It was predictable that Mr Brady would not succeed in this application. Even if he had not been
the subject of such intense public interest, it is hard to imagine any judge permitting a healthy
patient to take his own life by a positive act of will. Moreover, Mr Brady’s approach to his
detention made it likely that his hunger strike was a weapon against the hospital rather than a
considered decision to kill himself. It is not therefore surprising that the judge took the view that
his choice arose from his personality disorder and could therefore be overridden, both under
section 63 and on the ‘best interests’ test at common law.
Nevertheless, there are worrying features of the judgment. Once again, Hoffman LJ’s controversial
dictum in B v Croydon is cited to justify any sort of medical intervention which doctors believe
benefits the patient, whether physically or mentally. This goes far beyond what would be regarded,
on an ordinary construction of section 63, as ‘treatment for mental disorder’. Given the increased
emphasis on self-determination by those with mental health problems and the prospect of human
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rights challenges under Article 8, it is high time that the appellate courts looked at B v Croydon
again.
In any event, Maurice Kay J seems to have omitted a crucial link in his judgment; the ‘precedent
fact’ discussion does not address the point. Even if the hunger strike arose from Mr Brady’s
personality disorder, how can force feeding be regarded as treatment for that condition? If section
63 has any remaining meaning- other than ‘the RMO can treat as he or she wishes’- there must
surely be some connection between the treatment and alleviation of the condition. At least in 
B v Croydon the saving of life was an integral part of the treatment plan. It is not apparent from the
judgment how Mr Brady’s condition can be treated- but surely keeping someone alive, without
more, cannot reasonably be construed as ‘treatment for the mental disorder’? If it is, then Re C
itself would have to be reconsidered. 
There can be less argument with the judge’s logic with regard to the incapacity issue. If Mr Brady
was determined to risk his life to make a point he could reasonably be said to have not ‘weighed’
the treatment information. It might have been fairer if the case had been decided on this ground,
rather than section 63. 
The judge was probably wise to avoid ruling on the ‘suicide’ issue, since he did not need to do so.
However, he went a considerable distance towards disagreeing with Robb. The fact that he did not
comment upon B v Croydon, whether it was binding upon him or not, suggests that he was
instinctively more sympathetic to intervention than self-determination- again, a public policy
approach rather than a strictly legal one.
Finally, it is disappointing to see that the judge was prepared to make a costs order in a case so
manifestly of public interest. This application did not simply challenge a particular decision; it
raised fundamental issues of life and death upon which there was no directly applicable authority.
At least he did not make the order as a deterrent to future court action, which he was invited to
do. As Ms Kaufmann made clear, this would have impugned a fundamental human and
Convention right of access to the Courts.
